Hist 199 Postwar Japan: Dower Essay on

"The Most Terrible Bomb in the History of the World"

Key Questions:

Section 1, pp. 309-315

1. Was it necessary to use atomic bombs, at such great cost in civilian lives, to bring about Japan's surrender?

 

 

 

 

For most Americans, this is a "no-brainer": Yes!

 

 

 

 

2. But does more need to be said about the decision?

 

 

 

 

3. Previously secret or neglected documents have surfaced. What do they make clear?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(There WERE Roads Not Taken...)

4. To what extent is it appropriate to question the morality of using the bombs?

 

 

 

 

 

 

5. Dower wonders if asking these kinds of questions about "Roads Not Taken" is what Historians should do. What do you think?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6. Although it is difficult to identify single moment when everything came to a head, what date does Dower point to?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

July 25. Why?

 

 

 

 

 

 

See below for what Truman recorded in his handwritten diary for July 25th (312-314).

 

 

 

 

 

 

Some Background:

--FDR had died on April 12, 1945. His Vice President, Harry Truman, was not kept in the loop about the development of an Atomic Bomb. On April 25, Secretary of War Henry Stimson briefed President Truman on the Manhattan Project and the Bomb.

 

 

7. What did Truman learn at that point?

 

 

 

8. What did Stimson seem to be worried about?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

--Some Three months later, on July 16, 1945, the first Atomic Bomb was tested 210 miles south of Los Alamos, New Mexico, on the plains of the Alamogordo Bombing Range. The code name for the test was "Trinity." The first reports reached Truman on July 21. He had already gone to Potsdam where he would meet Churchill and Joseph Stalin for the first time.

 

 

 

 

8. How did people react to this test?

 

 

 

 

 

 

9. In 1979, scholars uncovered in the archives a handwritten diary of President Truman's. It had some revealing things to say about two things:

 

A. Diary Entry for July 25

i. What did Truman say he had told Mr. Stimson about the nature of the targets for the Bomb?

 

 

 

 

 

How realistic was his view?

 

ii. Dower quotes the Interim Committee's description on May 31 what the most desirable target for the Bomb would be (p. 313). What did it say?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

("A War plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers' houses.")

 

 

 

 

 

iii. What was Truman's attitude toward Japan's likely response to an advance warning statement?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

B. Dower finds this puzzling and suggests that the real questions were:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

--What might such a warning say with regards to the new type of weapon?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

--What might Japan expect from the victors if it did surrender?

 

 

 

 

 

 

On July 12 Secretary of War Stimson called Truman's attention to fact that Japan was seeking Soviet help in ending war so it became clear that if the US insists on "Unconditional Surrender," the Japanese might have no alternative but to fight on. [By this time, codebreakers allowed the US to learn what Japanese officials were saying, and Foreign Minister Togo was actively seeking Soviet help to end the war.]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

10. What did Acting Secretary of State (and former Ambassador to Japan) Joseph Grew try to convey to the President about what was crucial to the Japanese? (314)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Section 2, pp. 315-321

1. Who were some of the key people who supported the idea of modifying the demands for Unconditional Surrender?

 

 

 

 

 

 

2. A key sentence was proposed for Paragraph 12 of the Potsdam Declaration (315). What did it say?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

["This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if it be shown to the complete satisfaction of the world that such a government will never again aspire to aggression."]

 

 

 

 

 

 

3. Grew understood the obstacle that fear of the destruction of the emperor system constituted for the Japanese…What was his suggestion?

 

 

 

 

 

 

If some indication could be given that, in the end, Japanese themselves will be permitted to determine their own political future, they would be able to save face; without this, surrender is unlikely. 

 

Is this the kind of language that Japanese leaders needed to hear? Do you think it would it have sped up their acceptance of defeat and surrender if it had been included?

 

 

 

 

 

4. What are some possible explanations for Byrnes opposition to such a modification? (318)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5. Was Secretary of State James Byrnes open to something like this important sentence in Paragraph 12 that the Departments of State, War and Navy endorsed?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6. The prospect of Russia entering the war against Japan comes it for a lot of discussion. What did people think the impact might be?

 

 

 

 

7. How did the July 21 Test in New Mexico change the perceived strategic options for the US?

 

 

 

 

 

8. On July 17, Truman made entries in his Diary about having dinner with Churchill and what he learned. What does he say? (320-321)

 

 

 

 

9. Then, after the July 18th Bomb Test, his thinking takes another turn? What is his perception now?

 

 

Secton 3, pp. 321-328 (top)

1. Even before Truman became President, there had been much debate between the US and the UK about informing the global community about progress towards creating an Atomic Bomb, and informing Stalin and getting the Russians on board. What happened to these ideas?

 

 

 

 

 

2. What did theoretical physicist Niels Bohr recommend? How did FDR and Churchill respond? (322)

 

 

 

 

3. How about Oppenheimer and General George Marshall? What did they think? (323)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4. Timeline:

On July 24--2 days before the Potsdam Declaration was releasaed--what did President Truman order the U.S. Military to do?

 

 

 

 

Why is this significant?

 

 

 

 

 

Then, on what date did Pres. Truman give go-ahead to drop the first bomb?

 

 

 

 

(on July 31)

 

 

The Bomb was Dropped on Hiroshima August 6.

On August 8, USSR declares war on Japan.

August 9, the second Bomb dropped on Nagasaki.

 

 

 

 

5. On August 10 Japan announces its readiness to accept the provisions of Potsdam Declaration--but what was the "understanding" they included?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

"That said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as Sovereign Ruler."

 

 

 

 

6. How did the US government respond to this the following day?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers....

 

 

 

 

Is there anything here for Japanese rulers to latch on to?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

7. On August 14 a pre-recorded announcement by the Emperor went out over the radio air waves. What did it say?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

8. We have heard President Truman speak forcefully about how he had no regrets, no remorse for his decision. But what did he write in a personal letter to a senator on August 9? (326)

 

And what sort of order did he issue in the wake of the Nagasaki Bombing?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Section 4, pp. 328-334

1. Was a US invasion of Japan imminent in August of 1945? What was the schedule or plan for a hypothetical invasion?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

November 1, 1945 for Kyushu,

 

 

 

March 1946 for Honshu (main island).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2. The did the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey conclude about Japan's ability to continue to conduct the war in late 1945?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3. To conclude his article, Dower identifies 5 roads not taken (pp. 329-334). What were they?

(See below)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

a. Modifying or clarifying "Unconditional Surrender."

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Was it an obstacle that the Cold War vs the USSR in Europe was making US leaders want to provide the world and the USSR a powerful demonstration?

 

 

 

Or did it put pressure on US leaders to try an end the war without Russia's help so as to allow the US to set the terms of the peace AND the Occupation without deferring to the USSR?

 

 

 

 

 

b. Delaying use of Bombs until impact of the Soviets entering the war could be assessed.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

c. Laying the groundwork for international controls over nuclear weapons to avert an arms race.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

d. Demonstrating the Bomb at a test site or somewhere other than a predominantly civilian population center, and do so with adequate prior warning.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Or, barring that, inviting officials of foreign governments to come to the US and witness a test.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Or, was the US already too committed to making a statement to Japan and the world about our military might?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

e. Delaying the Second Bomb. Were the Japanese even given enough time to absorb what had happened at Hiroshima?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4. What were the casualty estimates reported in Ch. 3 of Ronald Takaki's book?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5. According to Takaki, what was the origin of the Unconditional Surrender idea? (34-38)

 

 

 

 

 

6. According to Takaki, How did US leaders react to Japan's stipulation when it agreed to terms of Potsdam Declaration?

 

 

 

 

Byrnes was infuriated but Admiral Leahy's more nuanced view prevailed. He claimed that the US counter-statement "implicitly recognized the Emperor's position by prescribing that his powers must be subject to the orders of the Allied Supreme Commander." So, in effect, the statement conceded that the Emperor would, in fact, have powers.

 

Truman was comfortable boasting that "They wanted to keep the Emperor. We told 'em we'd tell 'em how to keep him, but we'd make the terms."

 

It came down to parsing words.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

7. Here is a question not specifically addressed by Dower in this article but something I have wondered about. There was Inter-Departmental Area Committee on the Far East (IDAFE), which met 234 times between the autumn of 1942 and the summer of 1945 in order to make plans for the postwar occupation of Japan and thay had frequent discussions with two US presidents, Roosevelt and Truman.

So couldn't the following question be reasonably asked?

 

IF the feeling was so strong that removing Hirohito from his position as monarch and possibly trying him for War Crimes was NOT something that MacArthur and the US Occupation Officials desired, if it was not in America's best interests, why on earth would they not wish to retain Grew's crucial sentence in the Potsdam Declaration Draft and probably avert the necessity of deploying "the most terrible Bomb in the history of the world"?

 

There are some records available online from this Inter-Departmental Area Committee on the Far East (IDAFE) but I wasn't able to find many specifics...or to determine who--if anybody--had engaged in these kinds of conversations in the early stages of planning. But if this planning committee met 234 times, it stands to reason that some people might have been discussing this issue somewhere along the line!

 

 

 

For an detailed discussion on Hirohito's role during WWII and after, see here.

 

 

 

 

Also, there is a detailed review of a new book on the Tokyo War Crimes Trials by Gary Bass, Judgment at Tokyo: World War II on Trial and the Making of Modern Asia (Knopf) in the New Yorker from October 2023.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Scraps:

HT had a draft declaration, originating with Joseph Grew, that included in para #12 the phrase that …”This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty.”  Stimson, Leahy, Forrestal, Eisenhower, Marshall, MacArthur etc all felt such an assurance made sense.  They did not feel comfortable with the bomb

So why not include it?  Byrnes…

Plus lure of ending war without needing USSR.

July 31, HT gave final go-ahead for Bomb mission. 

HT went to Potsdam with Okinawa on his mind.  What was the impact of this?

When he made the decision, there was no imminent invasion of Japan in the offing.  

November 1 for Kyushu;

March 1946 for Honshu.

 

Options, roads Not Taken:

3. Modifying or clarifying Unconditional Surrender
4. Delaying use of Bomb until we can see affect of USSR entering war.
5. Laying the ground for international control of nuclear weapons before bombs actually used.
6. Demonstrating bomb at a test site. 
7. Delaying second bomb—Nagasaki = the forgotten bomb.  Rationale for 2nd bomb quickly seems morally troubling.  1st might have been justifiable; 2nd  a crime